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BOOK REVIEWS
Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship. MICHAEL
WALZER. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
1970. Pp. xvi, 244. 7.95.
Rules of conduct pervade human activity. Some are obvious because they are formally expressed: the judge who writes an opinion
consults the rules in his statute book; the chef preparing a chocolate
mousse follows the rules of his recipe. Other rules of conduct are impalpable: in polite society, persons eat with prescribed manners; in
ordinary conversation, we observe rules of demeanor, often without
knowing what they are.
To maintain stable patterns of human conduct, rules are frequently upheld and enforced with vigor; infractions that injure the
interests or supposed interests of others may be treated severely. Since
the rules of conduct called laws are basic to the social structure, persons grant them special seriousness. Precisely because of the high status
that legal rules enjoy, their kinship with other rules of conduct is often overlooked. This error particularly infects most discussions of an
ancient topic-the obligation to obey the laws.
Fortunately, Michael Walzer's book avoids this mistake. Professor
Waizer implicitly recognizes that legal rules, while differing from
other rules, resemble them in many respects. In particular, he argues
that the obligation to obey the laws is only one of many obligations
that persons may incur. From this perspective, he approaches contemporary problems of disobedience, war, and citizenship. Eleven essaysplus an introduction and two appendices-comprise the book. They
offer some provocative ideas. Nevertheless, as Professor Walzer himself
acknowledges, the book does not present a coherent theory of obligations, but only a series of attempts to apply a theory left largely unstated. The author neglects to argue for, or even state clearly, many of
his basic assumptions. As a result, the book frequently frustrates the
reader.
Throughout the book, Professor Walzer applies what he calls
"consent theory." As I understand it, consent theory assumes that:
1. A person should choose among alternative courses of conduct
by considering what obligations he has.
2. A person has obligations only because he has consented to
have them.
3. Therefore, a person can determine what obligations he has by
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examining what he has consented to. His moral obligations arise from
his moral biography.
I have phrased consent theory as a theory of making moral decisions,
that is, as a procedure for determining what a person should do. It
may also be phrased as a theory of moral judgment (a theory of
whether a person deserves praise or blame for what he has done) or
as a theory of moral justification (a theory of how an action or proposed action can be morally justified).
The theory, however phrased, is presented most strikingly in the
first essay,"The Obligation To Disobey."' Professor Walzer transforms
the doctrine that governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed." As originally used by Jefferson, the doctrine
was revolutionary-a rationale for overthrowing a tyrant who rules
without the people's consent. Later, among democratic apologists, it
became an ideology for compliance with the existing order. If we are
living in a democracy, we were told, we have consented to its laws and
must therefore obey them. In Professor Walzer's variant, we may have
consented to disobey a law and may therefore be obliged to disobey
it.2

This situation may arise, he argues, in any pluralistic society that
permits groups other than the state to form and flourish.3 In such a
society, persons will join a number of formal or informal groups. The
more formal ones will have rules and even systems for making rules.
Some of these groups acknowledge that their rules always yield to
those of the legal system-for example, a law-abiding corporation.
But other groups claim that their rules, at least sometimes, are superior in obligation to certain legal rules, even though they acknowledge
that most rules of the legal system remain supreme. These groups are
often quite analogous in structure to the state. They may have constitutions, by-laws, and elaborate structures for rule-making. They may
have procedures for admitting members far more formal than the citizen's tacit consent. Indeed, they may formally differ from the state
only because they claim authority over a portion of the member's conduct. The state, by contrast, claims authority over the entire conduct
of its citizens, subject only to limits set by the state itself.
Since these groups may formally resemble the state, Professor
Walzer reasons, a person may incur an obligation to obey the rules
I Pp. 3-23.
Pp. 3-4.
3 Pp. 10-16.
2
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of a group in very much the way he incurs an obligation to obey the
legal rules of the group called the state.4 While the supremacy clause
of the Constitution 5 makes the federal government legally superior
to all other governments, there is no obvious moral supremacy clause
that makes a government superior to a non-governmental group.
Once this argument is accepted for formal groups, applying it to
informal groups becomes only a matter of degree. In Professor Walzer's view, therefore, a person may decide that he should disobey a law
because he has a superior obligation to a group to do so.6 Similarly,
we may praise a person for disobedience because he follows such a superior obligation. Finally, a person may justify disobedience to a legal
rule by citing a superior obligation to obey the rules of a group.
Several things trouble me about Professor Walzer's argument and
his consent theory in general. First, he asserts that persons who disobey
laws typically do so as members or representatives of groups:
Men rarely break the law by themselves, or if they do they rarely
talk about it. Disobedience, when it is not criminally but morally,
religiously, or politically motivated, is almost always a collective
act, and it is justified by the values7 of the collectivity and the
mutual engagements of its members.
My own current experience does not fit Professor Walzer's model. I
regularly counsel young men who wish to avoid military service. After
they explore the available legal means, they confront the prospect of
the officer's order to step forward for induction. Many say they will
refuse, preferring prison or emigration to military service. Often, they
explain and justify their plans by moral reasons, but never, in my experience, by membership in a group that opposes war or even by loose
affiliation with a class of like-minded men. What they say about their
obligations, of course, may not be correct. But it would be surprising
to find that their moral justification springs from a group they never
even considered. I think a young man who refuses military service may
have ample moral justification in his lone conscience, even if he has
never heard of a war resister's league.
Second, Professor Walzer leaves the concept of consent so diffuse
that one cannot tell what a person has consented to and whether his
consent morally binds him any longer than he chooses. Consents, says
4 Pp. 14-16.
5

U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, d. 2.

6 Pp. 16-23.
7 P. 4.
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Professor Walzer, "are commitments to other people, or they are commitments to principles or parties or political institutions that arouse
expectations in other people."" At the outset, Professor Walzer claims
that he has never assumed the existence of consent "without looking
for evidence that it has actually been given."9 But his rules of evidence
are so imprecise that only he could apply them. Moreover, even assuming a person has consented to something, is his consent revocable
at will, revocable under certain conditions, or irrevocable altogether?
A consent theory, since it imitates the law of contracts, should provide
some way of answering this question. Professor Walzer, however,
merely avoids the issue.
Finally, and most fundamentally, Professor Wazer's consent theory-and, indeed, all theories of obligation through consent-trouble
me because they rest on the value that a person, above all else, should
keep his promises. Professor Wazer says:
Consent theory suggests a procedural rather than a substantive
ethics. It is not, in the usual sense of the phrase, a theory of value
(though it does provide certain evaluative criteria that may properly be applied to the procedures of moral life). It is a way of describing how particular men come to have obligations, not what
obligations they presently have. It invites us to search out what
this or that individual has agreed to do; it provides no information
as to what he "should" do or should have agreed to do---except
for the single injunction that he honor his commitments. 10
In this passage, Professor Walzer dignifies promise-keeping by calling
it honoring one's commitments. But it is still promise-keeping, and
any moral theory that takes that as its ultimate value seems shallow,
if not absurd. Over one hundred-twenty years ago, Thoreau wrote, in
his Civil Disobedience:
Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the slightest degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects
afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so
much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right
to assume is to do at any time what I think right."
I have never seen a persuasive answer to Thoreau's argument,
8 P. xiL
9 P. X.
10 Id.

11 H. THOREAU, CvL DISoBEmNcE 14 (Revell ed. 1964).
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either in Professor Walzer's book (where he disposes of it in a footnote)'2 or anywhere else.
Robert Horowitz*
12 A footnote merits a footnote. Professor Wazer says:

[O]bligations are always shared among men, who must judge one another. "The
only obligation which I have a right to assume," wrote Thoreau, "is to do at
any time what I think right." But when, in jail, he greeted the visiting Emerson with the famous question, "What are you doing out there?" he dearly implied the existence of a common obligation. Common to whom? Common at
least to New England philosophers, one of whom was failing to meet it.
P. 6 n.. Emerson had asked Thoreau what he was doing "in there." Thoreau's view
was that Emerson should be in jail with him-because it was right for each of them to
refuse to pay taxes. Professor Walzer confuses mutual obligation with similar obligation.
According to Thoreau, neither was obligated to the other; instead, they were each obligated to do what was right.

* Member, New York Bar. BA. 1964, M.A. 1970, Columbia University; J.D. 1967,
Harvard University.

